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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: docs/leios-design/README.md
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@@ -299,15 +299,15 @@ Even if it's too late for the honest node itself to vote on a tardy EB, the lack
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Thus, the honest node might later need to switch to a fork that requires having this EB, and that switch ideally wouldn't be delayed by waiting on that EB's arrival; the node should still acquire the EB as soon as it can.
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For this attack, the adversary would announce each EB promptly (by diffusing the corresponding RB headers on-time), but withhold the mini protocol messages that actually initiate the diffusion of substantial Leios traffic throughout the honest network.
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Only after withholding every EB's diffusion for 12 hours, would they suddenly release them.
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In this scenario---which is not the worst-case---the average would be 2160 * (1/3) = 720 EBs, but there could be hundreds more just due to luck and multi-leader slots.
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There could be thousands if the adversary is also grinding, for example, or had closer to 50% stake, etc.
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Only after withholding every EB's diffusion for 12 hours would they suddenly release them.
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In this scenario---which is not the worst-case---the average would be approximately 2160 * (1/3) = 720 EBs, but there could be hundreds more merely due to luck and multi-leader slots.
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There could be several thousand if the adversary is also grinding, for example, and/or had closer to 50% stake, etc.
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If each of the attacker's EBs has the maximum size of 500 kilobytes of tx references and 12.5 megabytes of actual txs---which don't even need to be valid---then that's an average of 720 * (12.5 + 0.5 megabytes) = 9.36 gigabytes the honest nodes will be eagerly diffusing throughout the network.
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For however long it takes for the network to (carefully) diffuse 10 gigabytes, honest traffic might diffuse more poorly.
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CIP-164 requires that Praos traffic will be preferred over Leios traffic, and that fresher Leios traffic will be preferred over stale Leios traffic.
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And doing so would prevent the burst from degrading contemporary honest traffic.
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However, there are some infrastructural resources that cannot be prioritized perfectly nor instantly redistributed, including: CPU, memory, disk, disk bandwidth, and buffer utilization on the nodes themselves but also along the Internet routers carrying packets between Cardano peers.
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CIP-164 requires that Praos traffic will be preferred over Leios traffic and that fresher Leios traffic will be preferred over stale Leios traffic.
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That would prevent the burst from degrading contemporary honest traffic if the prioritization could be perfect.
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However, there are some infrastructural resources that cannot be prioritized perfectly nor instantly reapportioned, including: CPU, memory, disk, disk bandwidth, and buffer utilization on the nodes themselves but also along the Internet routers carrying packets between Cardano peers.
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One non-obvious concern is that cloud providers often throttle users exhibiting large bursts of bandwidth, so a node might perform fine outside of a protocol burst but struggle disproportionately during one.
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(A node in a data center might not struggle at all to diffuse the 10 gigabytes over the course of each 12 hours but be very slow to diffuse it in a single burst that arrives every 12 hours.)
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@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ The identifying hashes of those txs alone is more than 230 megabytes.
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To maximize the bookkeeping overhead, for example, the adversary might choose to diffuse all of the EB bodies before diffusing any of their closures.
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It remains an engineering challenge to achieve as much prioritization as possible, especially during a protocol burst, without unnecessarily delaying the diffusion of any EB.
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That is, how to prevent this kind of protocol burst from increasing the latency of contemporary Praos and Leios traffic among honest nodes.
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That is, determining how to prevent this kind of protocol burst from increasing the latency of contemporary Praos and Leios traffic among honest nodes.
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The adversary is only able to issue EBs at an average rate in proportion to their resources (stake and grinding).
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There will be some variance, but in general they can do smaller bursts more often or larger bursts less often.
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